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Paul Woodruff. Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001

Reviewed by George Bennion

R

everence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue—the title is straightforward,
the subtitle a lament easily understood and therefore not much
elaborated. This book by Paul Woodruff (Professor of Humanities at the
University of Texas in Austin) is a delight, in part from the beauty and pertinence of the poetry that Woodruff brings in to illuminate his discussion,
and from the charm added by his explications. Woodruff is an experienced
and widely published translator of Plato, Thucydides, and other classic
works, and his prose is a joy as he illustrates the various facets of reverence
with brief scenarios and as well as longer stories.
Woodruff begins with a definition of reverence and continues to refine
it until the book ends:
Reverence begins in a deep understanding of human limitations; from
this grows the capacity to be in awe of whatever we believe lies outside
our control—God, truth, justice, nature, even death. The capacity for
awe, as it grows, brings with it the capacity for respecting fellow human
beings, flaws and all. This in turn fosters the ability to be ashamed when
we show moral flaws exceeding the normal human allotment. (3)

This notion of understanding our own human limitations is emphasized
throughout the book in many contexts, and is not to be confused with an
unwillingness to strive with might and mien nor as a denial that proper
motivation can result in amazing accomplishments.
Woodruff presents reverence mainly in social and political settings.
In fact, he is at some pains to demonstrate that it is a virtue not necessarily connected to religion. "Reverence has more to do with politics than
with religion" (4). "It is a natural mistake to think that reverence belongs
to religion. It belongs, rather, to community . . . [and] lies behind civility
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and all of the graces that make life in society bearable and pleasant" (5).
But it stands to reason that religion often promotes reverence. After all,
isn't the function of organized religion to guide us in our daily lives?
Two friends of mine commented separately upon this book, the first
saying that he did not think Woodruff religious; the second saying that
not many books change many people. As to the second, that sounds more
like an indictment of "many readers" than of "many books." As to the first,
if we recall the New Testament definition: "Pure religion and undefiled
before God and the Father is this, To visit the fatherless and widows in
their affliction" (James 1:27), we are pretty well obliged to see Woodruff as
genuinely religious. We may just as easily ask in what way is God religious?
Well, in nothing more than in his concern for the helpless and the poor,
and in his requirement that we make that our business also.
Though Woodruff's concern with reverence is pointed at humanity in general, not just the helpless and the poor, it necessarily includes
them. In chapter six, "Ancient China: The Way of Power," we are told that
Confucian Li, respect and reverence of every day life, helps keep people
from descending into animal behavior on the one hand and on the
other from assuming to themselves the prerogatives of heaven. "The ethical consequences are similar; both virtues [dignity and humility] act as
restraints on human power, and both work indirectly to protect the weak"
(104). "When Zi-you asked about filial piety, the Master said: 'Nowadays
filial piety merely means being able to feed one's parents. Even dogs and
horses are being fed. Without deference, how can you tell the difference?'"
(104, quoting Analects 2.7).
Ancient China's example is very important to Woodruff. He asserts
that reverential behavior moves down as well as up social hierarchies
and that it is fostered by ritual or ceremony. He notes that filial piety provides a structure for the natural affection of the child for his parents and
at the same time gives him practice in behavior beyond the family he will
use as an adult. The emperor also, through observance of the ceremonies
of courtesy, develops moral sensitivities that enable him to be reverent of
his ministers and also of ordinary citizens, in much the same way a father
develops respect for his son.
Touching these points, chapter two, "Without Reverence," contains a
vignette titled "Feeding Time." Family members are scattered to various
activities—Dad is with pals, David is at a friend's house, Mom has brought
Sarah home from soccer but has gone to a meeting. Sarah has her algebra
on her bed, a bag of chips in easy reach. She has dutifully put food out for
the dog, a pet not hungry right now. There will be human food on the table
later which may not be eaten by more than one or two people at a time,
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just when they are hungry. Remind you of Analects 2.7 above? Ceremonies
attendant on a family eating together can generate reverence.
Present societal understanding of irreverence is not exactly within
the scope of Woodruff's present concern, but early on he gives it a halfpage nod. Americans, and probably everyone else with the latitude to do
so, carry on a love affair with some form of irreverence. Referring to the
media, Woodruff says,
We hear more praise of irreverence than we do of reverence. . . . That
is because we naturally delight in mockery and we love making fun of
solemn things
In my view the media are using the word "irreverent"
for qualities that are not irreverent at all. A better way to say what they
have in mind would be "bold, boisterous, unrefined, unimpressed by
pretension"—all good things. (5)
He adds that Nietzsche is the "one great western philosopher who praises
reverence" and he "is also the most given to mockery" (5). Semantics may
get in our way here. I don't like 'mockery' (to me ugly and destructive)
subsumed under 'reverence,' but I am fine with 'unimpressed by pretension.' The case for irreverence probably should go something like this:
Alert, self-respecting people have always been quick to treat people, ideas,
and institutions irreverently that to them appear foolish. This irreverence
is especially so in people whose lives confront them with hard realities of
some sort, and who therefore develop a realism that is impatient, if not
disgusted, with triviality, falseness, or smokescreens of whatever variety.
Maurice Hilleman, the microbiologist who defeated mumps, measles, and
many other diseases, was such a man. It was said of him that he was helpful
and pleasant with his students and co-workers, but that "he had zero tolerance for fools." Most of us love that kind of attitude. If it strikes you that
disallowing fools their sway is too much like rudeness, Woodruff would
likely say reverence is the capacity to approve or disapprove appropriately.
It does not require one to praise or even allow foolishness. Many teachers
have delighted in the occasional student whose honesty and whose confidence in his own perceptions have equipped him to detect sham in any of
its guises. Such a student acknowledges authority and tradition only when
they prove out. This kind of irreverence is often associated with inventiveness, creativity, and exploration. It tends to make society better. Woodruff
calls this a part of reverence on the basis that reverence is a virtue that
enables people to respond sensitively to bad as well as good situations. The
student revolt of the 1960s may have started with something like that—
objection to what those students saw as false values in their parents' generation. But as Woodruff points out, irreverence is seductive. The delight
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it gives us should be a red flag. Its too easy and too frequent use can be the
start of arrogance and hubris (4, 91).
Other plausible scenes presented in chapter two help show the chaos
that can flow from groups operating without reverence. The point of one
example, titled "God Votes in a City Election," is clearer when we learn
that one party has posted signs all over town, "God voted against Proposition Two." Woodruff is showing the chasm between misdirected faith and
reverence. Another, "Dad Slugs the Umpire," is also parlayed into the continuing refinement of Woodruff's definition. A girl in a children's league
is called out on strikes. She is devastated, her furious father commits the
crime, and the newscasters with a good story are the big winners. "Learn
to control your emotions," counsels a psychologist (29). But Woodruff uses
this story to hone a point: "Virtue, after all, is supposed to be the capacity
to have the right emotions from the start. If you have emotions that need to
be controlled, you are already in trouble
Even when self-control is called
for, it is painful and prone to failure because it runs against our grain. But
reverence runs with the grain—or, rather, as you cultivate reverence, you
are changing the way your grain runs" (29-30).
One of the longer illustrations occurs in chapter five, "Ancient Greece:
The Way of Being Human." Woodruff mentions two particular concerns
of the ancient Greeks that are, naturally, like those of the ancient Chinese:
one, the danger of descending into animal behavior, and two, the danger
of losing sight of their human limitations. Woodruff reminds us that, in
the Iliad, Hector thinks that because he has driven the Greeks back against
their ships, he is a greater general than he really is, ignoring the fact
that his success is partly due to Achilles' having withdrawn from the
fighting. Blinded thus by false self-esteem, he launches an all-out thrust,
strips Achilles' armor from the careless Patroclus, and vaunts over him as
though he had killed Achilles himself. It costs him everything.
Achilles also loses perspective. Grief and anger at the death of Patroclus take his wits away, turn him animal, cause him to refuse suppliants,
and stir him to indecent speech. As his death approaches, Hector wants
agreement that whoever wins will allow the body of the fallen to be buried.
Achilles snarls, "'Don't try to cut any deals with me, Hector. / Do lions
make peace treaties with men? / Do wolves and lambs agree to get along?'"
(87, quoting Iliad 22.261-63). Later, Hector makes a dying request:
"I beg you, Achilles, by your own soul
And by your parents, do not
Allow the dogs to mutilate my body."
And Achilles, fixing him with a stare,
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"Don't whine to me about my parents,
You dog! I wish my stomach would let me
Cut off yourfleshin strips and eat it raw
For what you've done to me. There is no one
And no way to keep the dogs off your head."
(87, quoting Iliad 22.338-48).
In Woodruff's view, Achilles has utterly failed himself. He argues that even
in war we can be reverent, that we are in danger of brutalizing ourselves
if we lose sight of our basic humanity, the humanity, in fact, that we share
with our enemies and prisoners.
Odysseus seems to have had similar perceptions. After his violent
overthrow of the Suitors, he summons his old nurse Euryclea, who has,
for the past ten years, endured the violence and threats of the Suitors;
she stood as a buffer between them and her mistress, Penelope. When she
arrives and surveys the carnage, which until that day had been caused
by the Suitors, she sinks to her knees in profound relief and commences
an eerie, minor-key cry of triumph, exulting over the vanquished like
the tailor-bird Darzee in Kipling's "Rikki Tikki Tavi." Odysseus stops
her, saying, "Old Woman, it is not meet to exult over the dead" (Odyssey
22.407-16). He sees that, not only in their death but also in their having
disgraced their parents, shamed their places of origin, and offended the
gods, they have lost enough, and that gloating now would serve no purpose
but to debase her and him.
Woodruff's point brought harshly to mind something I witnessed
toward the end of WWII. In northern Luzon, I had walked a few miles
up a mountain road to visit a buddy at Division Artillery Headquarters.
It happened that while my friend and I were "cooling it" in the shade of
some shrubbery, a great cry went up. A starving and unarmed Japanese
straggler, cut off from his unit, had risked sneaking into the camp. He was
spotted searching the garbage cans for anything he could eat. Many GIs
ran howling for their weapons, carbines in that instance, and the pathetic
enemy scurried up one of the tall trees nearby. Those trees had no branches
for a hundred or hundred fifty feet and then a lot of foliage at the top. In
no time, the GI's were firing at him or at least at the top of the tree. His
fall was greeted with gleeful shouts, but when the game ended, something
sobered them.
In chapters ten and eleven, "The Reverent Leader" and "The Silent
Teacher," Woodruff endeavors to show how reverence can produce societies large and small that operate under mutual respect, without force
or violence. However, he notes that we may never see a purely reverent

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2005

5

BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 15
186 <--' BYU Studies

leader—"one man's leader is another man's tyrant" (163)—and warns
that it is difficult to practice reverence in an irreverent group. He uses the
disastrous affair between Athens and Melos for illustration. Athens was
leader of a league of city-states formed to repulse Persia, but over decades
had become tyrannical in that role. She sent a force to Melos demanding
submission, but the Melians, wanting autonomy, demanded justice. The
Athenians put it brutally: Justice can be discussed when both parties are
strong, but when only one is strong, it will take all it can and the weak have
to accept that. The Melians thought submission would be outright slavery,
and resisted. All the Melian men were killed, the women and children
enslaved. So we easily see Athens as tyrant, but Woodruff observes that
both parties were tyrannical—the Athenians obviously, but the Melian
leaders as well because they did not allow their citizens to take part in
their deliberations for fear the citizens would accept slavery rather than
fight. Leaders, he tells us, must start respect by showing it first, honestly,
to their followers—in classrooms or in larger societies. He warns against
teachers or leaders acting as though they were infallible (assuming divine
attributes), and against anything that would isolate them from their followers. Good leaders listen to their followers, a defense against bad judgment, and they are not offended if followers see flaws in their orders and,
on that basis, even disobey.
On the notion that ceremony can support the development of reverence, Woodruff reports that when Oliver North joined a combat unit in
Vietnam, his company commander wore a red bandana and allowed his
men to call him Organ Grinder. Woodruff's comment on that: "If you
carry guns and dress the part of a bandit, you may find it easier to play the
part of a bandit as well" (179). The next commander would not let his lieutenants speak to him until they cut their long hair and otherwise resumed
standard appearance. Woodruff ends this section by noting that those who
are given weapons for our defense do not hold them in their own service,
but in the service of the whole society, thus the greater emphasis on the
ceremonies that attempt to guarantee disciplined behavior in those who
hold weapons. This principle, he assures us, applies to nonmilitary societies also.
This book is readable—its language plain, its content home fare, its
illustrative material charming. But for me the primary values are (1) I was
unobtrusively challenged for having forgotten reverence; (2) I was provoked—especially by the ideal of a Chinese emperor learning, through
ceremonial behavior, to revere his subjects, like his European counterpart with the ideal of noblesse oblige. Such an ideal does not always take,
of course, but what is the alternative? The provocation was this: Is God
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reverent? Of what could the Great Creator stand in awe? After showing
Moses something of his creations, he said, "This is my work and my glory—
to bring to pass the immortality and eternal life of man" (Moses 1:39). The
size and scope of that divine undertaking argues more than a passing
interest. He must see something in us to have made such a huge investment.
That something must have to do with our intellect, its potential at least, for
he seems willing, against profound regret, to let us slip slowly or plunge
precipitately down to hell, but only because he holds that something he sees
in us inviolate. Considering the costs to him in labor, compassion, and all
the rest, that is an awe-inspiring instance of reverence.
This book is capable of changing some people.

George Bennion (benniong@juno.com) is Professor Emeritus of English,
Brigham Young University. He studied Greek literature at Arizona State University in the mid-seventies.
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